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I.

INTRODUCTION

Long ago, Thomas Hobbes wrote that a strong, central government
is necessary to control undisciplined human passions. Since those days,
these inherent interpersonal problems have been multiplied by a great
increase in population coupled with the advent of more complex economic and scientific problems. Now the government of a society as large and
diverse as the United States can truly be described as a complex and
omnipresent Leviathan.
As government involvement in our society has increased, so too
have conflicts between the citizenry and officialdom. While many individuals acquiesce in perceived injustices, some seek private revenge, and
others seek redress from the government. Official redress is available in
various forms: legislative reform, administrative relief, and judicial
action.
* B.A., J.D., University of Tennessee-Knoxville. Attorney, Tennessee Valley
Authority. Candidate, Doctor of the Science of Law (J.S.D.), Columbia University. The
author gratefully acknowledges his debt to Professors Harold L. Korn and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and most especially Professor Alfred Hill, Columbia University School of Law,
whose advice was invaluable. This article was conceived and written before the author's
employment with the Tennessee Valley Authority (T.V.A.) and the views expressed
therein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the T.V.A.
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Legislative reform is a blunt instrument not readily adaptable to
resolving individual conflicts between a citizen and a public official.
Furthermore, a legislative body has the discretion to simply ignore the
petition of an individual citizen. This discretion to refuse to decide is also
present when a citizen takes his complaint to a supervisory administrative
official. Such officials are also generally perceived as being predisposed
to favor members of their own class.
In contrast, courts are lauded for their neutrality, and a trial is more
finely attuned to the resolution of individual conflicts than is a legislative
enactment. Finally, and perhaps most important, is the fact that courts
generally do not have the discretion to refuse to decide a dispute.' For
these reasons, judicial action has become an exceedingly popular mode
of seeking official relief.
In recent times, this popularity has been evidenced by a large
number of suits for damages in the federal courts against public officials. 2 Federal litigation against state officials arises under 42 U.S.C §
1. This lack of discretion is exemplified by Chief Justice Marshall's often quoted
statement that federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). Of
course, this was an overly zealous denial of the federal courts' discretion to refuse to
decide, see Note, Stays of FederalProceedingsin Deference to Concurrently PendingState
CourtSuits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 688-93 (1960); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

980-1050 (2d ed. 1973) (discussing suits against state officers) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER 2d] but it is equally clear that the courts generally abide by the spirit of
Marshall's exhortation.
2. Financial realities often make governmental employers more attractive as defendants, and there is reason to believe that the prospects of a plaintiff's verdict is enhanced
when an individual official does not have to bear the full burden of liability. See Haber v.
County of Nassau, 557 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1977). Unfortunately for aggrieved citizens,
notions of sovereign immunity have proved to be a serious impediment to suits against
governmental entities.
In federal actions against state officers, a broad doctrine of governmental immunity
has been written into the statutory cause of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (denying monetary damages); City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (denying equitable relief). This interpretation is based upon the
fact that in drafting § 1983 "the House solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress
had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 190 (quoting Rep. Poland, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 804 (1871)). See also Comment, Aldingerv. Howardand PendentJurisdiction,77
COLUM. L. REV. 127, 144 nn. 92-94 (1977). Although ingenious plaintiff's attorneys have
devised various theories to circumvent this interpretation, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected these attempts to reach the fisc. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976)
(pendent party jurisdiction not available in civil rights action); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (state waiver of sovereign immunity rejected). The most recent
theory involves the implication of a federal cause of action arising directly under the
Constitution. See Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public
School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1322, 1355-66 (1976). Note, DamageRemedies Against
Municipalities for Constitutional Violations. 89 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1976). See also
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articles cited in note 10, infra. In view of the Court's immediate-istory of restricting the
scope of civil rights litigation, the implication of monetary damages against state governmental employers is unlikely. See Aldinger; Moor; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977) (eighth amendment not applicable to corporal punishment in public schools);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (narrowing § 1983's applicability to negligent
conduct); Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (libel action cannot be dressed in constitutional garb); Rizzo v. Good, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (restricting equitable remedies under §
1983). See generally Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court:Cutting the Civil
Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 49 (1976). The Court avoided this issue in
Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 425 U.S. 933 (1977).
But even if the Court does imply the remedy, the apparent constitutional stature of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will limit the implied relief to actions against cities and
counties. Although there is not a great deal of literature upon the subject until recent
times, see Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for PositiveGovernmental Wrongs, 44
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowack, The Scope of CongressionalPowerto CreateCauses
of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separationof Powers Issues in ControversiesAbout
Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1976). See also C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972), there is no doubt that the doctrine has constitutional underpinnings. State governments are immune to suit in federal courts. Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 312 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See
also U.S. CONST. amend. XI. But see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793);
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO.
L. REV 1 (1972) (arguing for a reassessment of sovereign immunity theory). Conversely,
counties and municipalities are not immune. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12
(1974). See also Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); Cowls v. Mercer
County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868). But cf. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970)
(holding counties and cities to be a mere arm of the state for double jeopardy purposes).
While § 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to ignore sovereign immunity
in implementing the fourteenth amendment, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See
also Nowack, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLUM L. REV. 1413 (1975), federal courts do not have this power. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
In suits against the federal government, the doctrine of sovereign immunity again is
present. See generally HART & WECHSLER 2d, supra note 1, at 1339-51, but Congress has
selectively waived this immunity by passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch.
753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3658 (1976). The selective nature of this waiver limits the
attractiveness of claims procedures in various ways. Punitive damages are not recoverable
against the government, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970), and the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury
trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970). Furthermore, the waiver does not apply to "[a]ny claim
arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights" except "with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States Government." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)(Supp. V 1975). Finally,
the waiver does not apply to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government
exercising due care in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
Federal agency or an employee of the Government; whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). This discretionary function exception to the general waiver of
imunity has been hopelessly confused by varying interpretations of the federal courts. See
HART & WECHSLER 2d, supra note 1, at 1351-77. CongressionalRecord, S. 2117, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S15284 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1977) would amend the
Federal Tort Claims Act by providing that
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1983 which provides that" [e]very person who, under color of [state law]
. . . subjects. . . any citizen. . . to the deprivation of any rights...
secured by the Constitution. . . shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law." 3 For various reasons, 4 Section 1983 was seldom invoked
until 19611 when it was given an expansive interpretation by the Supreme
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to
tort claims arising under the Constitution of the United States, to the same extent
as entitlement to compensation is recognized under the tort law of the place
where the violation occurred, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment
or for punitive damages.
See also CongressionalRecord, H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H 9722
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1977) (identical bill). This bill was introduced by the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Furthermore, the bill is supported by the United
States Attorney General. Letter from Griffin B. Bell to The Vice President, September 16,
1977.
3. Section 1983 was originally enacted as the first section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), an enforcement act passed by the Radical Congress over a
hundred years ago during the period of Reconstruction following the Civil War. The
historical background to the passage of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act is discussed in
M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 41-70 (1961) and Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Litigation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952).
4. The scope of § 1983 has in recent times been enlarged by the nationalization of
civil rights and a clarification by the Supreme Court of the act's requirement of action
taken under color of state law.
Section 1983 refers to "rights . . . secured by the Constitution," but until recent
times, the Constitution has been interpreted as placing few restrictions upon state governments and granting only limited rights to national citizens. See e.g., the Slaughter-House

Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See generally H. WECHSLER, THE NATIONALIZATION
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1968). Only in comparatively recent times have
significant portions of the Bill of Rights been made applicable to the states. See Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 541-47 (9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER]. A parallel
expansion has taken place concerning the requirement of equal protection, Id. at 657-65,
and the interpretation of procedural due process to encompass a right to a hearing. Id. at
895-97. This expansion has made § 1983 applicable to a much wider range of official
conduct.
The second factor in the expansion of civil rights litigation under § 1983 is the 1961
decision of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The requirement of action under color of
state law was arguably limited to official conduct formally sanctioned by state statutes or
judicial decisions. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 237-43 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The Court held, however, that "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is
action taken 'under color of' state law." 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
5. Table C-2 of the ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT] shows a

small but steady increase of litigation arising under federal civil rights statutes from 21
cases filed in 1944 to 280 filed in 1960. By 1970, the number of such suits being filed had
increased to 3,586. Id. at 231-33 (1970). This 1100% increase is especially significant when
compared to an increase of only 47.3% for total civil litigation during the same period. Id.
Table 12, at 107. By 1974, the number of civil rights suits commenced had risen to 7,294-a
130% increase in four years. Id. Table C-2, at 389 (1974).
Since the annual reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts place all private civil rights litigation in a single category, it is difficult to
determine the exact number of cases arising under § 1983. It is worth noting, however,
that from 1871 to 1920, there were only 21 reported cases arising under the statute. Note,
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Court. 6 Now the act is an omnipresent aspect of private litigation against

state officials.7 It has been observed that "a moderately canny pleader
should be able, in framing the issues, to describe much allegedly tortious

official conduct in constitutional terms." 8
Since Section 1983 applies only to individuals acting under color of
state law, it is not applicable to federal officers.' To fill this perceived
void, the federal courts appear to be developing an equally broad cause of
action against federal officers arising directly under the Constitution.10 In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureauof Narcotics, IIthe United States Supreme Court held that federal courts have the

power to award damages against federal officers who violate the fourth
amendment, and the lower courts have subsequently allowed damages
for violations of other portions of the Constitution. 12
Of course, the existence of these causes of action against state and
federal officials is attributable to the common notion that one who harms
another should pay damages. The issue of liability, however, is somewhat complicated by the fact that the defendants in these cases are public
officials. Except for judges and legislators, nineteenth century courts
The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate FederalCivil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361,
363-66 (1951). See also Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v.
Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 n.4 (1969) In contrast, there are 468 pages of annotation to
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1974), and the 1976 supplement has 230 more pages.
6. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) discussed in note 4 supra.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 353 (6th
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as GELLHORN & BYSE].
More recently, the Court appears to have adopted an ad hoc policy of restricting the
scope of the Constitution in damage actions arising under § 1983. Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment not applicable to corporal punishment in public
schools); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prisoner's medical malpractice claim does
not state a cause of action under § 1983); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation
by public officials cannot be twisted into a constitutional violation). Paul v. Davis has
been severely criticized as inconsistent with previous decisions of the Court. Shapiro, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist:A PreliminaryView, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293,322-38 (1976); The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv.L. REV. 58, 86-104 (1976). See also Monagham, Of "Liberty"
and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 423-29 (1977). These recent decisions may
require a re-evaluation of Professors Gellhorn and Byse's conjecture.
9. See Wheeldin V. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 n.2 (1963); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 n.1 (1971) (Harlan J.,
concurring); see also cases cited in 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3573, at 494-95 n.40 (1975).
10. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitutionas a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972). See also Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM L. REV.
1109 (1969); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the FederalCourts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
11. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
12. Cases are collected in Comment, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special
FactorsCounselling Hesitation," 9 IND. L. REV. 441, 449 nn. 51-57 (1976).
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generally made no distinction between official and private acts. 3 But as
population increased, society changed, and government became more
pervasive, this relatively unprotective approach to official liability was
discarded. 14 The current attitude is reflected in a recent opinion in which
the Supreme Court noted that
the public interest requires decisions and actions to enforce
laws for the protection of the public . . . . Public officials,
whether governors, mayors or police, legislators or judges,
who fall to make decisions when they are needed or who do not
act to implement decisions when they are made do not fully and
faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the idea
that officials have some immunity-absolute or qualified-for
their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of
immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to
risk some error and Fossible injury from such error than not to
decide or act at all.'
In addition to this utilitarian analysis, judges feel that it is simply unfair
to place officials in the dilemma of being required to exercise discretion
and yet subject them to personal liability for any mistaken judgments. 16
One might expect analogous state and federal officials to receive
coequal protection under federal law, but this expectation has yet to be
clearly fulfilled. Barr v. Mateo," a Supreme Court decision of the late
fifties, has generally been interpreted as establishing a broad doctrine of
13. This approach is exemplified by Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.)'170(1804),
in which a naval-offfEer was sued for seizing a foreign vessel pursuant to orders from the
Secretary of the Navy. When Captain Little pleaded his orders as justification for the
seizure, the plaintiff argued in replication that the orders were based upon an erroneous
interpretation by the executive branch of an act of Congress. The Court, per Justice
Marshall, affirmed a judgment against the captain: "instructions cannot change the nature
of the transaction, or legalize an act which, without those instructions would have been a
plain trespass." Id. at 179. Thus, the officer- like any citizen-could claim that his
conduct was actually lawful but could not claim any protection from liability for illegal
acts. See also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1670, 1671 (1833). The state courts' approach was similar. See, e.g., Miller v. Horton,
152 Mass. 590, 26 N.E. 100 (1891).
This early rule of official liability accorded with the lack of a powerful bureaucracy.
To be sure, some individual officials had a great deal of power, but their influence
stemmed from their personal prestige as private citizens. The granting of public office in
these cases was merely a formal recognition of the officer's social position. See Nelson,
Officeholding and Powerwielding:An Analysis of the Relationship Between Structure and
Style in American Administrative History, 10 LAW & Soc. REV. 187, 191-99 (1976).
14. See generally Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972). See also GELLHORN & BYSE supranote 8, at 33538.
15. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
16. For example, a policeman's lot should not be "so unhappy that he must choose
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable
cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1966).
17. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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absolute immunity for federal administrators,' 8 but more recent opinions

of the Court indicate that many state administrators are only entitled to a
qualified immunity.' 9 The propriety of such a dual system of official

immunities will be explored in this article.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF COEQUAL PROTECTION

The extent to which public officers should be protected from person-

al liability for their official actions has been a troublesome issue in
American law and has traditionally been complicated by unworkable 20 or
meaningless2 ' distinctions. But in cases arising under section 1983, the
18. See notes 58-66 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 26-29 infra and accompanying text.
20. One aspect of the problem of official immunity has been a distinction between
discretionary acts involving individual judgment and ministerial acts in which an official is
merely following orders and has no choice or discretion. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF
TORTS § 132, at 987-92 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.10 (1958) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
Traditional doctrine equates administrative officials performing discretionary acts with
judges-they are said to be quasi-judicial officers. Therefore these administrative officials
should be accorded the same absolute immunity to which judges are customarily entitled.
The distinction has been uniformly condemned as unrealistic. See PROSSER, § 132, at 988
("a finespun and more or less unworkable distinction"); HARPER & JAMES, § 29.10, at
1644 (1958) L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 240 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE]. See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 26.03 (3d ed. 1972).
In practice, the ministerial-discretionary distinction is simply a shorthand notation for the
process in which a court considers all the complex factors relevant to the choice between
an absolute or a qualified immunity. See JAFFE, supra, ch. 7. For example, in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1972) (on remand from the Supreme Court), the court had to decide whether federal law
enforcement officers should receive the protection of absolute immunity. The court used
the ministerial-discretionary rubric, but decided the case on general policy considerations:
Whereas it is true that a police officer must exercise some discretion in making an
arrest, the fiction that this act is not discretionary is maintained because of the
belief that the benefit to society derived from the protection of personal liberties
outweighs the detriment of perhaps deterring vigorous police action.
Id. at 1346.
Happily, the Supreme Court has not utilized the ministerial-discretionary distinction
in its civil rights decisions. The distinction has no relevance to the immunity of legislators
or judges. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
In the Court's only other absolute immunity decision, the explicit reliance upon considerations of public policy was used instead of a detailed analysis of discretion. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The distinction has also been eschewed in the Court's
qualified immunity decisions. For example, one would assume that members of a school
board who hear evidence and then determine whether a student should be expelled from
school would be considered quasi-judicial officers, but the Court has held that such board
members are only entitled to a qualified immunity. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975).
21. Some scholars have attempted to distinguish immunities from privileges-the
implication of this dichotomy being that an immunity completely avoids liability while a
privilege is a matter of defense that will only defeat liability under particular circumstances. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 45A, Scope Note (Tent. Draft
No. 19, 1973). At the same time, the RESTATEMENT recognizes the existence of "absolute" privileges. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10, Comment d (1965). The federal
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Supreme Court has adopted a comparatively simple system of protection
in which state officials are either afforded an absolute immunity or a
qualified immunity.
A.

State Officers
When state legislators, 22 judges23 and prosecuting attorneys 24 are
sued in a federal civil rights action, they are protected by an absolute
immunity. Since there are seldom any absolutes in the law, it is not
surprising to discover that an official cloaked with an absolute immunity
is not absolutely protected. Rather, he is protected only when acting
within the scope of his official duties.25 Perhaps full immunity would be a
more accurate description, but the courts have chosen otherwise.
Executive officials have not been as fortunate as the officers of the
other branches of state government. Governors, 26 law enforcement offi29
cers, 27 school board members, 28 and superintendents of insane asylums
have been accorded only a qualified immunity. By qualified immunity,
the courts mean that an official is only protected when he has acted in
good faith.
B.

FederalOfficers
Aside from decision concerning the speech or debate clause of the
Constitution,3" this century has seen only one significant Supreme Court
courts have eschewed this distinction in favor of a system of absolute and qualified
immunities. See, e.g., text accompanying note 15 supra.
22. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
23. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
24. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court left open the question of
whether a prosecutor is protected by an absolute immunity when he acts "in the role of an
administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate." Id. at 430-31.
25. For example, judges are accorded an absolute immunity for "acts within the
judicial role." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). If a judge ordered his bailiff to remove someone from the
courtroom, he would be acting in his judicial role and be absolutely immune. But the
absolute immunity does not protect a judge who physicially throws someone out of his
courtroom. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). The commission of a
battery is not within the scope of judicial duties. Similarly, a Congressman who votes to
illegally imprison someone is nevertheless acting as a legislator, but if he actually participates in the arrest, he loses his absolute immunity. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168 (1880).
26. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See also Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78
(1909). The Court in Scheuer also extended the protection of only a qualified immunity to
a state adjutant general, his assistant, officers and enlisted members of the Ohio National
Guard, and the President of Kent State University.
27. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
28. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1974).
29. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
30. See cases discussed in notes 91-100 infra and accompanying text.
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decision concerning the scope of protection to be afforded federal officers. 3 1 In Barrv. Mateo,32 the Court held that two federal officials acting
within the scope of their authority were absolutely immune to suit for
libel. During the sixties, the lower federal courts expanded the Barr
into a general doctrine of absolute immunity for federal offidecision
33
cers.
In considering the present status of the Barr decision, one is
tempted to assume a judicial role and analyze the relative merits of
absolute and qualified immunities, but this approach has a serious pitfall
for one who is not acting as a judge. Since neither of the two immunities
is clearly the more appropriate, the selection of one or the other in a
particular case almost becomes a matter of individual preference.
The subjective nature of the process is illustrated by a method of
analysis outlined by the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 4
They suggest that in resolving the problem of official immunity a "court
must weigh numerous factors and make a measured decision on the basis
of that assessment." 3 5 These factors are set out with great detail in a list
that is replete with words and phrases such as "likelihood" and "extent
to which":
(1) The nature and importance of the function which the
officer is performing ...
(2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise
of discretion by the officer will amount necessarily to passing
judgment by the court on the conduct of a coordinate branch of
government ...
(3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would
impair the free exercise of his discretion by the officer....
(4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on the officer...
(5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of
the public if the action is taken ...
31. In a companion case to Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) the Court held that the
immunity issue is a federal question in a state action against federal officers. Howard v.

Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). The only other cases are Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Court implied

that federal law enforcement officers should receive only a qualified immunity, see notes
87-90 infra and accompanying text; Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1926) (per curiam), in
which a lower court decision, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926) was affirmed with a single

sentence; and Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913), in which the Court followed without
comment its nineteenth century opinions concerning judicial immunity.
32. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
33. See notes 58-66 infra and accompanying text.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
35. Id., Comment f.
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(6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm which
may be produced ...
(7) The availability to the injured party of other remedies
and other forms of relief. .

..

Each of these factors raises a number of sub-issues. 7 Without denying
the patent relevance of the suggested considerations, one should realize
that this detailed analysis simply enables a judge to consider every aspect
of the problem before making his individual choice.
The issue of official immunity cannot be resolved by summing
values and reaching an empirically pleasing conclusion. The problem
involves dissimilar and conflicting considerations whose common value
can only be determined by subjective, individual judgment. In practice,
the binding nature of appellate decisions greatly restricts the personal
inclinations of lower judges. This allocation of power to the appellate
superstructure gives added meaning to the decisions of appellate judges.
In contrast, it would be presumptuous for an observer to recite his own
predilections concerning official immunity.
This does not mean, however, that the question of official immunity
is simply a matter of a judge's personal preference and his position in the
judicial pecking order. Rational discourse is not foreclosed. While recognizing the presence of subjective choice, one can urge the relevance of
additional considerations. Arguments based upon generally accepted
values may be presented. Finally, it is not unreasonable to expect some
degree of consistency within a system of official immunities.
Drawing upon generally accepted values, this article will present an
argument that the general expansion of the Barr decision to cloak
virtually all federal officials with an absolute immunity is no longer
valid. The Supreme Court's immunity decisions concerning state officers
should be viewed as equally applicable to federal officers, and the Barr
decision should be relegated to the status of a special rule applicable to
official communications.
III.

THE RISE OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

The origins of the federal doctrine of absolute immunity can be
traced back to the nineteenth century. In Bradley v. Fisher,38 an attorney
36. Id. The comment concludes by noting that analysis of these factors is necessarily
shaded by "the general attitude of the jurisdiction, and of the court, toward the subject of
government tort liability." Id.
37. For example, the Restatement recites nine different questions implicated by a
consideration of "the nature and importance of the function which the officer is performing." Id.
38. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
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sued a District of Columbia judge for wrongfully and maliciously disbarring him from practicing before the Supreme Court of the District."9 The
court held that
it is a general principal of the highest importance to the proper

administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself

aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with
the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that indepen-

dence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useful. 4°

Although a previous decision had indicated that judicial immunity might
not protect malicious or corrupt conduct,41 the Bradley Court expressly
rejected the possibility of such a qualified immunity.4 2 "The allegation of

malicious or corrupt motives could always be made, and if the motives
could be inquired into judges would be subjected to the same vexatious

litigation upon such allegations, whether the motives had or had not any
real existence." 43 Almost ten years later in 1880, the Court held that
congressmen are also protected by an absolute immunity. 44 This decision, however, was based upon the speech or debate clause of the
Constitution rather than common law. 45
39. The case arose from the trial of John Suratt for the murder of Abraham Lincoln.
During the course of the trial, Judge Fisher, the presiding judge, and Mr. Bradley, an
attorney for the accused, had a disagreement. As a result of this disagreement, Judge
Fisher subsequently entered an order striking Mr. Bradley from the roll of attorneys of the
Supreme Court of the District. Id. at 336-37.
40. Id. at 347.
41. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
42. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350-51.
43. Id. at 354.
44. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
45. Article I, § 6 of the Constitution provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), the protection afforded by this clause was
extended to cover "things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members
in relation to the business before it." Id. at 204. See also Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U.S. 82 (1966); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (immunity from criminal
charges). Officials acting on behalf of Congress are not entitled to the absolute protection
of the speech or debate clause. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1966). But see Gravel v. United States, 308 U.S.
606 (1972) discussed in notes 91 & 92 infra and accompanying text. Thus in Kilbourn the
doctrine of absolute immunity protected congressmen who initiated proceedings that
resulted in the plaintiff's unlawful imprisonment, but the Sergeant-at-Arms who accomplished the arrest and imprisonment eventually had to pay $20,000. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 11 D.C. (MacArth. & M.) 401, 432 (1883).
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By the turn of the century, the protection of absolute immunity was
extended to high executive officers. In Spalding v. Vilas,46 another
action governed by the law of the District of Columbia, an attorney
alleged that the Postmaster General-by means of official communications-induced third parties to breach their contracts. 47 The Court decided that the position of Postmaster General is analogous to that of a
judge48 and held that "heads of Executive Departments when engaged in
the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law" 49 are protected by an
absolute immunity.
Although the rule of absolute immunity announced in Spalding
might have been restricted to cabinet officers and other high officials, the
federal courts were reluctant to draw the line.50 In this country, the
seminal official immunity decision has been Gregoire v. Biddle, 5' in
which two successive Attorneys-General of the United States, two successive Directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of
Justice, and the District Director of Immigration at Ellis Island were
sued-apparently under state law-for false arrest and false imprisonment. In a forceful opinion, Chief Judge Learned Hand argued that
It does indeed go without saying that an official who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for
any other personal motive not connected with the public good,
should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and,
if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the
guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justifica46. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
47. Apparently the plaintiff was retained by numerous postmasters to obtain a readjustment of their salaries, and the readjustment was eventually accomplished by an act of
Congress. The plaintiff alleged that the Postmaster General subsequently "undertook to
induce the clients of the plaintiff to repudiate the contracts they had made." Id. at 486.
48. We are of the opinion that the same general considerations of public policy
and convenience which demand for judges . . . immunity from civil suits for
damages arising from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their
judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made by
heads of Executive Departments.
Id. at 498.
49. Id.
50. For example, in Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), a special assistant to
the United States Attorney was sued for malicious prosecution. Despite allegations that
the defendant attorney had become a special assistant solely in order to institute improper
proceedings against the plaintiff, the court of appeals held that the defendant attorney was
protected by an absolute immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the decison with a brief,
one-sentence, per curiam decision. 275 U.S. 503 (1927). The exact basis of the Court's
decision is unclear. It seems, however, that the Court viewed the prosecutor as a judicial
officer entitled to enjoy the well established doctrine of judicial immunity rather than an
ordinary agent of the executive branch. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 30 (1976). In
support of its decision, the Court cited Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872),
and Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913) (another judicial immunity case).
51. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
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tion for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to
submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome,
would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Again and again the public interest calls for action which may
turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an
official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of
his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public
officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite
another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As
is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those
52 who
try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
This immunity, however, was limited to conduct within the scope of a
particular official's powers.53
Hand's decision in Gregoire was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Barr v. Mateo,5 a District of Columbia libel action against the Acting
Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization. In a plurality decision joined
by three other justices, Justice Harlan wrote that the principle of
absolute immunity previously announced by the Court in Vilas was not
restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank.
The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office but
an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective
functioning of government. The complexities and magnitude of
52. Id. at 581.
53. In defining the scope of an official's power, Chief Judge Hand noted that
it can be argued that official powers, since they exist only for the public good,
never cover occasions where the public good is not their aim, and hence that to
exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to overstep its bounds. A moment's
reflection shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation
without defeating the whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that the officer
must be acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion must be
such as would have justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of the
purposes on whose account it was vested in him.
Id. at 581.
54. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). See also Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (involving the
immunity of a federal officer in the context of a state cause of action).
55. In a concurring opinion, Justice Black wrote:
So far as I am concerned, if federal employees are to be subjected to such
restraints (i.e. libel actions) in reporting their views about how to run the government better, the restraint will have to be imposed expressly by Congress and not
by the general libel laws of the States or of the District of Columbia.
360 U.S. at 577 (footnote omitted).
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governmental activity have become so great that there must of
necessity be a delegation and redelegation of authority as to
many functions, and we cannot say that these functions become
less important simply because they are 56exercised by officers of
lower rank in the executive hierarchy.
As in Gregoire, a scope of powers limitation was placed upon the notion
of absolute immunity. "The fact that the action.

. .

taken [is] within the

outer perimeter of [an57 officer's] line of duty is enough to render the
privilege applicable."
During the early sixties, Justice Harlan's plurality opinion was
expanded by the lower federal courts to protect virtually all types of
official conduct. There were two dimensions to this expansion. Seizing
upon Harlan's pronouncement that absolute privilege is not a badge or
emolument of exalted office, the courts rapidly extended the immunity to
the lowest levels of officialdom. CIA agents were free to libel suspicious
persons.58 Social Security claims representatives, 59 and even private
concerns engaged in defense work6° were protected. A second dimension
of the judicial implementation of Barrinvolved an expansion of immunity to protect conduct other than speech.
Barr, itself, and most of its progeny 61 involve defamation actions.
Nevertheless, the underlying rationale of Barr seems equally applicable
to other types of conduct. 62 Gregoire involved a claim of false imprisonment, and cases after Barr gave an absolute protection to such diverse
conduct as conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act 63 and improperly
placing a tax lien upon a bank account. 4 The high water mark of the
federal courts' enchantment with absolute immunity is found in Norton
v. McShane,65 a case in which the plaintiffs alleged that they had been
56. Id. at 572-73 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 575.
It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer
sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted-the relation of the act
complained of to "matters committed by laws to his control or supervision"...
which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes
the official acts of the executive officer with immunity.
Id. at 573-74.
58. Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968), noted in Note, Spying and Slandering:
An Absolute Privilegefor the CIA Agent?, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 752 (1967).
59. Poss v. Lieberman, 299 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
60. Becker v. Philco Corp., 372 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 979 (1967).
61. See, e.g., id.; Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968); Poss v. Lieberman, 299
F.2d 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
62. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 26.04 at 598 (Supp. 1976).
63. S. & S. Logging Co. v. Barker, 366 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1966).
64. Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961). See also David v. Cohen, 407 F.2d
1268 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Ahlstrand v. Lethert, 319 F. Supp. 283 (D. Minn. 1970).
65. 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
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unlawfully and maliciously arrested, imprisoned, and physically beaten

A divided court held that the defendants were
by federal marshalls.
66
absolutely immune.

IV.

THE FALL

While the lower courts were rapidly expanding the Barr decision,
the Supreme Court eschewed further consideration of the immunity
afforded federal executive officers. 67 The issue of immunity arose, however, in other contexts.
A.

Supreme CourtDecisions Since Barr

Prior to the sixties, there is very little federal authority on the
immunity available to state officials. The series of cases culminating in
Barr v. Mateo all involve federal officers. This lack of authority is due to
the fact that actions against public officials for damages are generally
based upon common law tort principles. 68 Since there is no general
federal common law of torts,69 most actions against federal or state
officials have historically arisen under state common law. 70 When a state
66. Accord Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688,692-93 n.3
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. grantedsub nom. Butz v. Economou, 97 S.Ct. 1097 (1977); Scherer v.
Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); Gallella v. Onassis,
487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). Galella has since been disavowed by the Second Circuit.
The decision in Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), was probably
colored by the fact that the case arose from the attempted enforcement of federal civil
rights legislation in Mississippi during the Civil Rights movement of the early Sixties.
67. The Court denied writs of certiorari in many cases. See Scherer v. Brennan, 389
U.S. 1021 (1967); Norton v. McShane, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); Poss v. Lieberman, 370 U.S.
944 (1962). See especially Becker v. Philco Corp., 389 U.S. 979 (1967) (dissent from denial
of writ of certiorari).
68. Of course, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and the decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), are exceptions to
this statement.
69. This has not always been the case. In 1842, the Supreme Court held that in
diversity cases, issues of commercial law are controlled by general principles of common
law. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In 1893, the rule was extended to tort
actions. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893). There are, however, few
reported federal cases dealing with the liability in damages of state officials, and those that
are reported rely upon state law. See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Brightman, 53 F.2d 161
(8th Cir. 1931). This dearth of precedent is possibly due to the fact that state officials deal
primarily with citizens of their own state, and diversity of citizenship is therefore often
lacking. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a state official could remove such an action from
state court to a federal court since he would presumably be a citizen of the state in which
the action was brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1970).
The limited federal common law of tort established in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh,
149 U.S. 368 (1893) was eliminated by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus
the statement in the text is accurate for the period of time when the full scope of absolute
immunity was being established in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950), and Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
70. Many of the federal cases arose under a federal common law in the District of
Columbia, but these cases naturally involved federal officers rather than state officers.
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tort action is filed against a federal officer, the question of immunity is
clearly governed by federal law.7" Likewise, the immunity of state
officials to suit under state law could be a federal question where the
immunity protects unconstitutional conduct,72 but this potential method
of developing a federal law of immunity for state officers has been
restricted historically by the comparatively narrow applicability of the
Constitution to the states. Only in recent times has the Supreme Court
expanded the Constitution to cover a wide range of state activities.73
The 1961 decision of Monroe v. Pape74 insured that the federal
courts would have to develop a system of immunities applicable to state
officials. Monroe involved a suit for damages under section 1983 against
a group of Chicago policemen alleging an illegal search of the plaintiffs'
home followed by an illegal arrest and detention." On appeal, the
Supreme Court placed a broad interpretation upon the civil rights statute's requirement of action under color of state law76 and rejected a
proposed requirement of specific intent to deprive an individual of his
71. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. In Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1131-35 (1969), a
strong argument is made that the Constitution envisages an arrangement whereby official
wrongs can be remedied under a state common law consisting of both state and Constitutional law. Under such an arrangement, a state doctrine of official immunity that unduly
restricts a citizen's remedy would run afoul of the Constitution when the complained of
conduct violates the Constitution. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 211 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This approach is supported by the Court's rejection of state
doctrines of sovereign immunity, in what were otherwise state actions, where constitutional rights are involved. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S.
636 (1911), rev'ing 77 S.C. 12, 57 S.E. 551 (1906).
73. See note 4 supra.
74. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
75. The plaintiffs alleged that 13 police officers broke into their home in the early
morning without a search warrant and forced them to stand naked in the living room while
every room was ransacked, drawers were emptied and mattresses were ripped. The
plaintiff, Mr. Monroe, was then arrested without a warrant and interrogated for ten hours
about a two-day-old murder. He was not allowed to telephone his family or an attorney.
Mr. Monroe was subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred against
him. 365 U.S. at 169. See also Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
76. The statute provides that only individuals who act "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory" are liable. 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1970). Since the alleged conduct of the defendants was clearly illegal and unauthorized under state law, the defendants contended that § 1983 was not applicable and the
plaintiffs should be left to the remedies provided by state law. This argument convinced
Justice Frankfurter, see 365 U.S. at 202-59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but the rest of the
Court relied upon previous construction of the same phrase in a civil rights statute
providing criminal penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) as interpreted in United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Thus the Court
held that "misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under
color of' state law." 365 U.S. at 184.
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federal rights.77 The Court concluded that section 1983 "should be read
against the background of tort liability that78 makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions."
Some courts concluded from Monroe that the doctrine of official
immunity was not available in actions arising under section 1983, 79 but in
1966, this interpretation was repudiated by the Supreme Court in Pierson
v. Ray.80 Pierson involved a group of white and black clergymen who

attempted to use a segregated bus terminal waiting room in Mississippi in
1961. Three policemen arrested them for violating a state breach of peace
statute, and they were then tried and convicted by a municipal police
justice. The cases, however, were dropped after an appeal to the county
court. 81 In another case, the Supreme Court subsequently declared the

same breach of peace statute unconstitutional as applied to similar
facts.82 The clergymen filed a civil rights action against the three policemen and the judge. Since the arrest and conviction were unconstitutional,
the only legal issue presented was whether the state officials were
protected by an immunity.
Although section 1983 is cast in terms of strict liability, 3 the Court
held that "the legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress
did not mean to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. "84 In the
case of the defendant judge, the Court followed the rule of absolute

immunity that it had recognized for federal judges in Bradley v. Fisher.
The arresting officers, however, received different treatment. Without
mentioning Barr, the Court noted that police officers generally have

been accorded only a defense of good faith and probable cause in making
an arrest. Concerning reliance upon an unconstitutional statute, the Court
77. The criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), referred to in note 76 supra, imposed
criminal sanctions only for acts "willfully" done, and the Court had construed this as
requiring "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right." Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945). Since § 1983 does not use the word "willfully," the
specific intent requirement was not extended to civil actions. 365 U.S. at 187. See also Id.
at 206-08 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78. 365 U.S. at 187.
79. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 547 (1966).
80. 386 U.S. 547 (1966).
81. In the trial de novo of one of the clergymen, the County Court directed a verdict
of acquittal. The cases against the other clergymen were then dropped. Id. at 550.
82. See Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965).
83. Some early cases indicated that the language of § 1983 precludes the development
of a system of official immunities. Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 250 (3d
Cir. 1945). See also Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946). Needless to
say, this is now a dead issue.
84. 386 U.S. at 554.
85. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) See also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(holding state legislators absolutely immune to suit under § 1983).
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held that a policeman is excused "from liability for acting under a statute
that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied.''86
In 1971, litigation against law enforcement officers again reached
the Supreme Court. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,87 the Court held that a cause of action
against federal agents arises directly under the fourth amendment. Although the Court did not consider the issue of immunity, 88 in a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted the problems caused by his plurality
opinion in Barr and wrote that
while I express no view on the immunity defense offered in the
instant case, I deem it proper to venture the thought that at the
very least such a remedy would be available for the most
flagrant and patently unjustified sorts of police conduct. Although litigants may not often choose to seek relief, it is
important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of the
Nation's government stand ready to afford a remedy in these
circumstances. 89
On the remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the
broader implications of its previous decision in Gregoire v. Biddle and
decided that the defendant agents were only entitled to qualified immunity. 90
The Court next considered the issue of immunities in the context of
the speech or debate clause. In Gravel v. United States,91 the clause's
absolute protection was extended to congressional aides insofar as their
conduct would be a protected legislative act if actually performed by a
member of Congress. The Court noted that the complexities of the
modem legislative process required that legislative assistants be treated
as congressmen's alter egos lest the purpose of the speech or debate
clause be "diminished and frustrated."9
86. 386 U.S. at 555.
87. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
88. Id. at 397-98. But see HART & WECHSLER 2d, supra note 1, at 1421.
89. 403 U.S. at 411.
90. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972). Accord, Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d
688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. grantedsub nom. Butz v. Economou, 97 S.Ct. 1097 (1977).
91. 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Gravel case involved a grand jury investigation of the
leaking of the Pentagon Papers. Senator Gravel had obtained a copy of the Papers and
placed them in the public record. At issue was the power of a grand jury to compel

testimony from Senator Gravel's aides concerning the papers. Presumably the speech or
debate clause would be equally protective in the case of tort liability. But see Reinstein &
Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113,
1171-77 (1973).
92. 408 U.S. at 617. The Court forcefully noted that
it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative
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A year later the issue of congressional immunity was again before
the Court. Doe v. McMillan93 involved a District of Columbia libel
action against members of Congress who ordered the publication of an

official report concerning the District of Columbia school system and
administrative officials who implemented the order. Justice White, writ-

ing for the majority, held that "general, public dissemination of materials otherwise actionable under local law is not protected by the Speech
or Debate Clause." 94 Nevertheless, the congressional defendants were

entitled to an absolute immunity because they voted for the publication
and distribution and did not actually participate in the alleged general,
public dissemination. 95 This absolute immunity, however, did not extend
to the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents. Following

past precedent,96 the Court held that "legislative functionaries carrying
out such nonlegislative directives" are not protected by the speech or
97
debate clause.
The administrative officers attempted to circumvent this long established rule of liability by relying upon Barr, but the Court rejected this
alternate route to absolute protection. 98 During the course of its conprocess. . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without
the help of aides and assistants; . . . the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as the latters' alter
egos; and if they are not so recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate
Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary-will inevitably be diminished and frus-

trated.
Id. at 616-17.
93. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
94. Id. at 317.
95. "Members of Congress are themselves immune for ordering or voting for a
publication going beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function." Id. at
315. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
96. The Court cited Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); and Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
97. 412 U.S. at 315. This seemingly unjust dichotomy is due to the nature of congressional liability. For example, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the House of
Representatives passed a resolution ordering the arrest and imprisonment of Kilbourn. A
claim of false imprisonment against members of the House was barred by the speech or
debate clause but allowed against the House's Sergeant-at-Arms who accomplished the
arrest. This arrangement of immunity protected congressmen from liability based solely
upon their official votes and yet provided Kilbourn with a remedy for his patently illegal
imprisonment. If a congressman had actually participated in the arrest, he presumably
would have been liable the same as the Sergeant-at-Arms.
In response to Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), a bill was introduced in the
Senate to fully immunize the Public Printer and all officers and employees from liability
for printing, binding, and distribution. CongressionalRecord, S.2399, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 32654 (1973). See S. REP. No. 421, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Although the bill passed the Senate, it apparently died in the House. Congressional
Record, S.2399, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 33118 (1973). The bill was subsequently reintroduced in the 94th Congress, but again failed to be enacted. Congressional
Record, S.3023, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S2174 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1976).
98. The Court reasoned:
The Printing Office is independently created and manned and invested with its
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sideration of Barr, the Court cited immunity cases arising under section
1983 and discussed these cases as if there were no distinction between the

nature of immunity in civil rights actions against state officers and the
immunity accorded federal officers. 99 Of course, this failure to distinguish the immunity accorded state and federal officers may be dismissed
as an instance of sloppy writing in a case where the distinction is
irrelevant to the merits,
but it might also evidence a tendency of the Court
°°
to equate the two.1

In Scheuer v, Rhodes,101 a case arising out of the Kent State
tragedy, the Court resumed its consideration of the scope of immunity to
be accorded state officials in civil rights actions. In Scheuer, various
officials of the state of Ohio ranging from the Governor to enlisted
members of the National Guard1°2 were sued under section 1983 for the
own statutory duties; but, we do not think that its independent establishment
carries with it an independent immunity. Rather, the Printing Office is immune
from suit when it prints for an executive department for example, only to the
extent that it would be if it were part of the department itself, or, in other words,
to the extent that the department head himself would be immune if he ran his own
printing press and distributed his own documents. To hold otherwise would mean
that an executive department could acquire immunity for non-immune materials
merely by presenting the proper certificate to the Public Printer, who would then
have the duty to print the material. Under such a holding, the department would
have a seemingly fool-proof method for manufacturing immunity for materials
which the Court would not otherwise hold immune if not sufficiently connected
with the "official duties" of the department.
412 U.S. at 323 (citing Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959).
Of course, this argument improperly equates the immunities afforded executive
department heads and members of Congress. A congressman may vote to publish a report
that is not related to any legitimate legislative purpose, and yet his conduct would be
immune under the speech or debate clause because it involved the casting of a vote. But if
the head of an executive department were to order the publication of a defamatory report
totally unrelated to his office, his conduct would surely be beyond the outer perimeter of
the duties of his office, and he would not be entitled to any official immunity. Therefore,
the Court's fear of manufacturing immunity could not arise in cases where the head of an
executive department orders the publication of a defamatory report.
Such manufactured immunity would, however, be possible in the context of the
speech or debate clause, and the Court presumably rejected Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959), for this reason.
99. The Court noted that "Judges, like executive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of their motive or good faith. Barr v.
Mateo, [360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959)]; Perison v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555 (1967). But
policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more limited privilege." 412 U.S. at 319.
100. In a separate opinion, the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and
Stewart apparently gave a strong endorsement to Chief Judge Hand's decision in Gregoire
v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). 412 U.S. at 342-43
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This endorsement, however,
must be read in the context of the Doe decision. There is not even a hint in Doe that the
defendants were not acting in good faith. Accord, Doe v. McMillan, 566 F.2d 713 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (subsequent trial). In the absence of such allegations, a qualified immunity
would provide absolute protection for acts performed within the outer perimeter of an
official's duties.
101. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
102. Also sued were the State Adjutant General, his assistant, various national guard
officers and the president of Kent State University.
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wrongful deaths of the plaintiffs' decedents. The defendants claimed an
absolute immunity and obtained a summary judgment on this issue in the
lower courts."0 3 The Court began its consideration of the immunity issue
by recognizing the obvious.
Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute or qualified-for their acts is a recognition that they may
err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to

injury
assume that it is better to risk some error and possible
from such error than not to decide or act at all. 1°4
The manner in which the Court reached its decision is less obvious.
The Court's justification of its decision is remarkable for its failure
to consider analogous precedent. The Court's prior decisions in Spalding
v. Vilas10 5 and Barr v. Mateo'06 seem to indicate an absolute immunity
for governors, but these decisions are only mentioned cursorily in a
discussion of the factors generally relevant to official immunities." °7
Similarly, the Court had previously indicated that a state governor is not
absolutely immune to suit under section 1983108 but the only allusion to
this prior decision appears in a generalized discussion. 1°9 Finally, the
Court did not even refer to analogous state precedent. 110
103. The district court dismissed the action on the basis of the eleventh amendment.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on this issue and held in the alternative that
the suit was barred by an absolute immunity. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1972). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court ruling that the action
was barred by the eleventh amendment. See 416 U.S. at 237-38.
104. 416 U.S. at 242.
105. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., 416 U.S. at 240 n.4: "Good-faith performance of a discretionary duty
remained, it seems, a defense.. .. See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 493 et seq.
(1896)."
108. In Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), a state governor was sued under § 1983
(then: Rev. Stat. § 1979) for false imprisonment in connection with a declaration of a state
of insurrection. The Court held the governor to be immune, noting:
So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they
are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge
and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he
had not reasonable ground for his belief.
Id. at 85.
109. 416 U.S. at 248.
110. State precedents concerning the immunity of governors and other high officials
are in disarray. The Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), and Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959), decisions are paralleled by many state cases holding governors and other
higher officers absolutely immune to suit for defamation. See, e.g., Ryan v. Wilson, 231
Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941) (governor). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
591 (1977). Cases are collected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591, Note (Tent.
Draft. No. 20, 1974). Similarly, the Supreme Court's previous indication of only a
qualified immunity for state governors is paralleled by dicta in state tort cases not
involving defamation. Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914); Druecker v.
Salomon, 21 Wis. 621 (1867), as interpreted in Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 158, 97
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Without really considering these analogous precedents, the Court
merely recited the considerations generally relevant to official immunity
and then noted that "[section] 1983 would be drained of meaning were
we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high executive officer have
the quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property and unreviewable through the judicial power of the

Federal Government."II Although the statute was not in danger of being
drained of meaning, 112 the Court concluded that the governor and other
defendants were entitled only to a qualified immunity.
The Court's seeming distaste for absolute immunity for administrative officials continued in Wood v. Strickland,113 a civil rights action
filed by two expelled high school students against the members of their
school board." 4 The students alleged that they had been denied due
process of law during the course of their expulsion. 5 Since the defendants were clearly acting within the outer limits of their duties, they
claimed an absolute immunity." 6 In considering this claim, the Court
noted that state courts had generally held that school officials are only
entitled to a qualified immunity.
[T]he judgment implicit in this common-law development is
that absolute immunity would not be justified

. .

. Pierson v.

N.W. 942, 945 (1904). See also Bujaki v. Egan, 237 F. Supp. 822 (D. Alaska 1965)
(diversity case); Finnell v. Pitts, 132 So. 2d 5 (Ala. 1930). Cf. Wiegand v. West, 73 Or. 249,
144 P. 481 (1914).
111. 416 U.S. at 248. The quotation is from Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397
(1932), a case involving injunctive relief against a state governor. Although the Court
appeared to rely upon Constantin in justifying its decision, see 416 U.S. at 248-49, this
reliance is misplaced. The concept of official immunity is not applicable where there is no
risk to officials of personal liability. See note 161 infra.
112. See the hypothetical opinion in text accompanying notes 157 & 158 infra.
113. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The decision of the court of appeals is reported in Strickland
v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'ing, 348 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
114. The students also sued their school district, superintendent of the school district,
and school principal, but the district court directed verdicts in favor of these parties. The
court of appeals affirmed these directed verdicts, and the plaintiffs apparently decided not
to petition the Supreme Court to review this potion of the appellate court's decision. 420
U.S. 308, 309 n.1.
115. The students were expelled for adding two bottles of malt liquor to punch served
at a meeting of an extracurricular school organization. About a week and a half after the
meeting, the school principal learned that the students had spiked the punch, and he
suspended them for a two week period. In ex parte proceedings, the school board
reviewed the principal's decision and voted to expel the students for the remainder of the
semester, a period of about three months. A second meeting of the school board was
subsequently held with the students, their counsel, and parents attending. The students
admitted spiking the punch and pleaded for leniency, but the board voted not to change its
decision. 420 U.S. at 311-13.
116. 420 U.S. at 314. The court of appeals agreed with the defendants. Krause v.
Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972). Accord, Martone v. McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373 (5th
Cir. 1969) (immunity of state governor).
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Ray, and Scheuer v. Rhodes drew upon a very similar background and were animated by a very similar judgment in
construing § 1983. Absent legislative guidance, we now rely on
those same sources in determining whether and to what extent
school officials are immune from damage suits under § 1983.117
Thus the school officials received only a qualified immunity.
Since Wood, the Court has considered the immunity of state officials in two more civil rights cases. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,"I the
superintendent of a state mental hospital was accorded a qualified immunity. More recently in Imbler v. Pachtman,"19 a state prosecuting
attorney was sued under section 1983 for concealing exculpatory evidence. Using a common law analysis and basing its decision upon public
policy, the Court decided that state prosecutors are entitled to an absolute
immunity when engaged in activities associated with the judicial proc120
ess.
Barr v. Mateo: From GeneralRule to Exception
The general attitude emerging from the Supreme Court's civil rights
decisions is that state legislators, judges, and prosecutors are absolutely
immune to liability for their official conduct, while state administrative
officials are protected by only a qualified immunity. But are these
attitudes not equally applicable in the case of federal officials? An
affirmative answer to this question can be premised upon more than an
aesthetic quest for symmetry. Surely state and federal officials are functionally equivalent. The Constitution allocates socially important spheres
of influence to both state and national governments. Likewise, state
officials are generally as trustworthy and reliable as their federal counterparts. In any event, it is difficult to contend that any disparity between
B.

117. 420 U.S. at 320-21. Earlier in the opinion, the Court stated that "Common-law
tradition, recognized in our prior decisions, and strong public-policy reasons also lead to a
construction of § 1983 extending a qualified good-faith immunity to school board members
from liability for damages under that section." Id. at 318.
118. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
119. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
120. The Court restricted the application of its opinion to prosecutors whose conduct is
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." 424 U.S. at 430.
Prosecutors involved in the investigatory phase of the criminal process may well have to
settle for a qualified immunity. See Id. at 430-31. See also Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850,
852 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 272 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976). This
distinction, however, is easier to state than to apply. Compare the two opinions in Briggs
v. Goodwin, 46 U.S.L.W. 2178 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 21, 1977).
A bill was subsequently introduced in the Senate to abolish prosecutorial immunity for
withholding evidence. CongressionalRecord, S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REC. S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977). See also 123 CONG. REC. S201 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977)
(remarks of Sen. Mathias).
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the two groups is sufficient to cloak one with an absolute immunity and
the other with only a qualified protection. Thus, in the case of law
enforcement officers, "it would . . . be incongruous and confusing, to
say the least, if. . . under one phase of federal law a police officer had
immunity and . . . under another phase of federal law he had no

immunity." 2 l
A second reason to expect uniformity lies in the nature of this
country's judicial system. In the sixties, there was a general trend in the
lower federal courts to adopt a general rule of absolute immunity, 2 ' but
state courts thought that a qualified immunity provided sufficient protection for inferior officers.1 23 This disparate treatment can be explained as a
difference of opinion in the weighing of various policy factors, and such
a disparity is acceptable in our federal system of government. As long as
there is no overriding federal interest involved, the state courts have the
ultimate power to resolve questions of official immunity, but when the
issue becomes a matter of federal law, there is no longer any room for
disparate treatment of state and federal officers. In view of the functional
equivalence of state and federal officers, the conflicting considerations of
policy must be resolved one way or the other. A continued state of
unequal treatment is unacceptable.
Finally, coequal treatment of the federal and state officials is justifiable as a matter of administrative convenience.124 Why complicate tort
actions against government officials by having two different systems of
immunity when one will suffice? Since ultimate responsibility in the
absence of legislative action lies with the Supreme Court, a uniform
system of immunities would require significantly fewer opinions from
the Court than would a bifurcated treatment.
121. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d
688, 695 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 97 S. Ct. 1097
(1977). Cf. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976), in which the court stated:
"We believe that different rules should not obtain for federal prosecutors on a Bivens
theory and for state prosecutors sued under § 1983. The policy considerations are exactly
the same in each case." Id. at 834.
122. See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 548 P.2d 1223 (1976), noted in 25
KAN. L. REV. 308 (1977), See also PROSSER, supra note 20, § 132, at 989; K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExr, § 26.04, at 882-83 (Supp. 1970). In so far as defamation
actions are concerned, the states have generally agreed that a governor or other superior
executive officer should be protected by an absolute immunity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 591, Note (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974) (collecting cases).
124. "[T]he practical advantage of having just one federal immunity doctrine for suits
arising under federal law is self-evident." Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.
1975).
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To a large degree, the Court has already mandated coequal protection for state and federal officials. The speech or debate clause of the
Constitution protects members of Congress with an absolute immunity, 1' and a similar immunity has been accorded state legislators in
actions arising under section 1983.126 As a matter of common law, the
Supreme Court has accorded federal judges an absolute immunity, 127 and
state judges receive the same protection in civil rights actions. 128 State
and federal prosecutors also receive coequal protection. 129
The comparative status of state and federal administrative officials
is not as clear. The Postmaster General was clearly given an absolute
immunity in Spalding v. Vilas"3 ° and the more recent decision of Barrv.
Mateo appears to extend this full protection to most other federal officials. At least this was the belief of the many lower court decisions that
eagerly embraced the broader implications of Barr. But Barr and Spalding could also be interpreted as narrow holdings recognizing the importance of administrative officials being able to communicate openly and
freely among themselves and with the public. This is the interpretation
Justice Harlan gave his Barr opinion in a subsequent case.131 Although
Spalding was not an action for defamation, the alleged wrongdoing
involved official communications.13 2 Depending upon which interpretation is accepted, the Court's subsequent decision in Bivens is either
evidence of an exception to a general rule of absolute immunity or
evidence of a general rule of qualified immunity.
In Bivens, Justice Harlan wrote that his opinion in Barr should not
be expanded to protect federal law enforcement officers who indulge in
1 33
"the most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts of police conduct,
and on the remand, the court of appeals limited the defendants to a
qualified immunity. 134 Bivens' analogue in civil rights litigation is Pier125. See note 45 supra.
126. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

127. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). See also Alzua v. Johnson, 231
U.S. 106 (1913).

128. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
129. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (§ 1983 case). See also Yaselli v. Goff,
12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
130. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
131. In 1970, Justice Harlan explained that the need for "keeping the public informed"
underlay his opinion in Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Wiseman v. Massachusetts,
398 U.S. 960, 961 (1970) (dissent from denial of certiorari). See also Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
132. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
134. See note 90 supra.
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son v. Ray135 in which state police officers received only a qualified
immunity.
Although Pierson and the implications of Bivens can be viewed as a
comparatively narrow exception to Barr, the Court's decision in Wood
v. Strickland136 is in clear conflict with the broader implications of Barr.
Since Wood involved neither law enforcement officers nor flagrant and
patently unjustified conduct, the decision strongly suggests that the
general expansion of Barr by the lower federal courts was misguided.
Indeed, unless there is a nonfunctional basis for distinguishing the
Court's treatment of state and federal officials, Barr must now be viewed
as an exception to a general rule of qualified immunity for federal
administrative officials.
1. Official Conduct in Violation of the Constitution
The disparate treatment accorded public officials in Barr and the
Court's civil rights decisions can be explained in terms of the type of
norm that the officials allegedly violated. Barr involved a common law
action for libel, 137 whereas Bivens and all of the Court's section 1983
decisions involved alleged violations of the Constitution. Thus, the
disparity between Barr and the Court's civil rights decisions could be
attributed to an implicit decision that constitutional rights are entitled 38to
greater protection than lesser rights created by statute or common law.
This distinction finds support in many post-Barr decisions of the
lower courts. In a comparatively old case arising under state law, federal
game wardens who violated the fourth amendment did not receive the
protection of absolute immunity. 139 More recently, and in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Bivens, many courts have rejected pleas by
federal officials for absolute immunity in suits arising under the Constitution. In Mark v. Groff,140 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
135. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See text accompanying note 86 supra. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974), could also be viewed as an analog to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in the sense that physical
force was used by state officers against private citizens. Similarly, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) involved allegations of false imprisonment.
136. See notes 113-17 supra and accompanying text.
137. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), also involved a common law suit.
138. See, e.g., Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 455 (6th Cir. 1972) (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Cf. Expeditions
Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(en banc).
139. Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Kelley v. Dunne, 344
F.2d 129 (lst Cir. 1965) (fourth amendment violation).
140. 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Flood v. Harrington, 532 F.2d 1248 (9th

Cir. 1976).
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that "Scheuer . . . destroyed the notion of absolute immunity for

executive officials," 141 and similar conclusions have been reached in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit142 and others.1 43
This distinction may formally resolve any apparent conflict between
Barr and Wood, but its practical effect would be to place severe
limitations upon absolute official immunity. Virtually any official tort
can be described as a constitutional violation. 1" It is interesting to note
that this distinction based upon violations of the Constitution probably
leaves the actual holding of Barr intact since the Court has recently held
that the defamation of an individual by a public official does not violate
the Constitution.145
2. Comity
Disparate treatment by the federal courts of state and federal officers
might also be justified on the basis of comity. While the lower federal
courts were eagerly expanding Barr, the state courts often retained a rule
of qualified immunity. 14 6 Certainly states have a strong interest in protecting their officials, but this interest would be overridden if state
doctrines of official immunity unduly restrict federally created rights.147
It would be, however, the height of officiousness for a federal judge to
decide that the states are not providing sufficient protection to state
officials. 148 Thus, in Pierson, the Court recognized that "[t]he common
141. 521 F.2d at 1379. See also Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1199 n.5
(9th Cir. 1975) (dictum). More recently the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
hinted that the effect of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), upon the scope of Barr v.
Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), might possibly be limited to the facts of Scheuer. Midwest
Growers Coop Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 464 n.22 (9th Cir. 1976). Such a distinction, however, seems untenable after Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1974). In any
event, the court in Midwest Growers used a qualified immunity analysis.
142. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972). In a more recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has again refused to accord an absolute immunity to federal officials, but there is no
indication in the opinion that the officials were alleged to have violated the Constitution.
Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
grantedsub nom. Butz v. Economou, 97 S. Ct. 1097 (1977).
143. Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976); Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872
(5th Cir. 1976); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974); States Marine Lines,
Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 90-94
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Cf. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976). Even the President
of the United States has been held liable for official acts that were in violation of the
Constitution. Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).
144. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
145. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
146. See note 123 supra.
147. Cf. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (immunity of federal officer in a state
defamation action is a matter of federal law). See also Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484
F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973).
148. But see Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) in which former
Judge Stevens said that a state official's "protection cannot be either limited or expanded
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law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity." ' 149 Similarly, the Court noted in Wood that "[a]Ithough there have
been differing emphases and formulations of the common-law immunity
of public school officials. . . state courts have generally recognized that
such officers should be protected from tort liability under state law for all0
good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to fulfill their official duties."15
Although these decisions might be interpreted as a simple deference to
state law where the immunity of state officials are involved, a distinction
between federal and state officials based upon notions of comity cannot
survive careful analysis of the Court's opinion.
The Pierson case involved the issue of whether two Mississippi
police officers were entitled to rely upon an unconstitutional state statute.
The Court admitted that some states do not allow such reliance, 151 but
announced an apparent uniform rule allowing good-faith reliance. If the
Court had been concerned with comity, it surely would have looked to
Mississippi law rather than
establish a uniform rule based upon general
52
considerations of policy.1
This apparent quest for uniformity is graphically illustrated by the
Wood decision. Wood can be explained either as a rejection by the Court
of the broader implications of Barr or as a decision to defer to the lesser
protection provided to state officials by state law. Although the Court
alluded to the general state trend of qualified immunity, no attempt was
made to determine the extent of immunity accorded the defendant officials by their employer, the State of Arkansas. This failure is crucial
because the district court had held that under state law the defendants
were absolutely immune. 153 Thus, the Court's decision cannot be read as
merely deferring to a lesser standard of protection established by state
of a federal
law. Quite the contrary. Wood marks a rejection by the Court
54
1
officials.
administrative
for
immunity
absolute
of
rule
by a state's statutory definition of his authority or responsibility." Id. at 608.
149. 386 U.S. at 555.
150. 420 U.S. at 318.
151. The Court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121, Caveat (1965) and Miller
v. Stinnett, 257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958) (a diversity case). 386 U.S. at 555 n. 10. See also
PROSSER, supra note 20, § 132, at 991 n.21.
152. Although the Court's decision happened to conform with Mississippi law, there is
no indication in the decision that this coincidence was intentional. See Fidtler v. Rundle,
497 F.2d 794, 799 (3d Cir. 1974).
153. The trial court cited ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1812 (1960). Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F.
Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972). Absolute immunity premised on state law was also rejected
in Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973).
154. Similarly, the Court refused to extend absolute immunity to all administrative
officials serving Congress. See notes 93-100 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Legislative Mandate
The Court's rejection of a general rule of absolute immunity for
state administrative officials might also be attributed to legislative mandate. Since section 1983 is drafted in absolute terms which starkly
command that "every person

. . .

shall be liable," decisions such as

Scheuer or Wood might be described as a reluctant abandonment of a
preferred standard of absolute immunity in the face of a legislative fiat.
Indeed, the Court noted in Scheuer that "[Section] 1983 would be
drained of meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other
high executive officer have 'the quality of a supreme and unchangable
[sic] edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property and unreviewable
through the judicial power of the Federal Government.' "155
Despite the presence of this language in Scheuer, the notion that the
Court's decision was dictated by the words of section 1983 seems rather
naive. 156 After all, the statute was seldom invoked for almost a hundred
years when it was awakened from its dogmatic slumber by the Court's
decision in Monroe v. Pape. Surely a court that has breathed life into
such a candidate for desuetude is not going to defer piously to the
nineteenth century concepts of immunity embodied in section 1983.
Only in Scheuer has a majority of the Court hinted at such ingenuous deference,1 57 and even there a plain meaning interpretation was not
necessary to reconcile the result with the Court's previous decisions. A
judge who endorsed the broader implications of Barr could have written
the following opinion in Scheuer:
State and federal officials are accorded coequal protection
in the federal courts. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(judge). Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) with
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547. As a general rule, administrative
officials are accorded an absolute immunity for conduct within
the outer perimeter of their duties. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564
155. 416 U.S. at 248 (quoting from Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
See also McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1968); Jobson v. Henne,
355 F.2d 129, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1966).
156. The argument was expressly rejected in Economou v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 695 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Butz v.
Economou, 97 S. Ct. 1097 (1977).
157. This issue has generally been raised by members of the Court who disagree with a
position taken by the majority. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 433-34 (1976)
(White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558-61
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 382 (1951) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (semble).
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(1959). See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
There exists, however, an exception to this general rule. Where
officials commit acts of violence, a citizen's right to a remedy
will not be absolutely barred. In such a case, a qualified
immunity or good faith defense is sufficient to protect conscientious officials. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
The application of Barr v. Mateo as limited by the Bivens
decision in civil rights actions will not emasculate section 1983.
The most important aspect of civil rights litigation in modern
times has been the availability of equitable remedies to implement this Court's decisions in cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education and Baker v. Carr. Of course, the doctrine of
official immunity cannot bar such equitable relief. Nor does
absolute immunity impair the original goals of section 1983 in
the context of an action for damages. The Reconstruction
Congress was primarily concerned with the problem of violence, and the exception to the general rule of immunity
evidenced by Pierson, Bivens, and Monroe insures the
continuing availability of monetary damages in such situations.
The Court therefore holds that the defendants are only
entitled to a qualified immunity in this action for the wrongful
death of the plaintiffs' decedents.
Of course, the Scheuer decision would have been even simpler for a
court that viewed Barr as an exception to a general rule of qualified
immunity for administrative officials.
The Court's decision in Wood v. Strickland indicates a final rejection of the broader implications of Barr. Since Wood did not involve
violence or physical restraint, the case fell squarely within the broader
implications of Barr. Nevertheless, the Court held that absolute immunity was not appropriate. In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not
even hint that it felt constrained by some chimerical legislative intent.
Instead, the Cou noted that state courts had decided that
absolute immunity would not be justified since it would not
sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise
their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of
a remedy for students subjected to intentional or otherwise
inexcusable deprivations.
Tenney v. Brandhove, Pierson v. Ray, and Scheuer v.
Rhodes drew upon a very similar background and were
animated by a very similar judgment in construing § 1983.
Absent legislative guidance, we now rely on those same

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss2/1

30

1977]

Casto: Barr v. Mateo and the Problem of Coequal Protection for State and

COEQUAL PROTECTION

sources in determining whether and to what extent school
officials are immune from damage suits under § 1983.58
This decision in Wood exemplifies the Court's approach to official
immunity since the Barr decision.
4. A Return to Spalding v. Vilas
Disparate treatment of state and federal administrative officers
might also be premised upon the greater visibility of national officials. In
the early decision of Spalding v. Vilas ,159 the Court appeared to restrict
absolute immunity to cabinet level officials. While Justice Harlan has
pointed out an obvious flaw in this distinction," 6 there exists another,
more rational basis for the dichotomy. The concept of immunity is based
in part upon the idea that government resources should not be wasted on
meritless, harassing litigation. 161 Since official conduct at the higher
levels of government affects a broader range of citizens, high level
officials are more likely to find themselves embroiled in a significant
amount of meritless private litigation. Therefore it can be argued that
cabinet level officers need the greater protection of absolute immunity.
Regardless of the merits of this argument, it is not compelled by the
Court's decision in Spalding and appears to conflict with the Court's
decision in Scheuer v. Rhodes. Spalding involved the issue of liability
based upon official communications and therefore should be viewed
along with Barr as a guarantee of freedom of official communication.
Furthermore, the idea that high officials are entitled to an absolute
immunity does not comport with the Court's decision in Scheuer that the
governor of a state is only entitled to a qualified immunity. Unless the
158. 420 U.S. at 320-21. Similarly, in its most recent discussion of official immunity in
civil rights actions, the Court based its decision upon public policy rather than legislative
mandate. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). But see id. at 433-37 (Whiie, J.,
concurring).
159. 161 U.S. 483 (1896). See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
160. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
161. Although suits are filed against officials in their personal capacity, the expense of
litigation is usually born by the government. C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE & S. ELMENDORF,
TORT LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS ch. 1 XIII (1976). Suits against
federal officials are generally defended by Department of Justice attorneys. Letter from

Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Richardson Preyer, Member, House of Representatives, (May 6, 1977), reprinted in

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LAWSUITS

AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT RELATING TO A BILL TO AMEND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at

1 (1977). Private attorneys are retained in cases involving a possible conflict of interest.
Id.. In a sense, the rationale of conserving government resources is inconsistent with the
generally accepted idea that the doctrine of official immunity is not applicable in a suit for
injunctive relief. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975) (dictum); Rowley v.
McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974). See also J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 749-50 (1975).
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Court is prepared to overrule Scheuer, no greater protection should be
given cabinet officers. Certainly it would be hopeless for courts to
attempt to analyze the comparative susceptibility of federal cabinet officers and state governors to suit.
Despite the apparent trend of the Court's civil rights opinions, one
bastion of absolute immunity for administrative officers may remain.
Does the Court's decision in Scheuer mean that a state governor's federal
analog should also be denied the protection of absolute immunity? In
Halperin v. Kissinger,162 a federal district court held a former President
of the United States liable for damages caused by his official conduct.
Thus, at least one court has pushed Scheuer to its logical extreme. But
perhaps the position of President should be considered sui generis in the
context of official immunity.
It takes little imagination to foresee possibly catastrophic consequences flowing from the Halperin decision. The President symbolizes
the national government and is the best known government official in our
society. If he is now subject to suit by every disgruntled citizen who can
spell the words "bad faith" in a civil complaint, the potential for harm is
obvious. Any motion for summary judgment based upon only a qualified
immunity-good faith defense for the President can be legitimately
countered by the plaintiff's request for discovery on the issue of good
faith.163 Of course, a federal judge has great discretion in the area of
discovery, but can a plaintiff properly be denied access to the defendant's
testimony upon such a crucial issue? No doubt some judges would limit
discovery in consideration of the importance of the President's time, but
judicial discretion in this area is so great that accurate prediction of a
particular judge's decision is impossible.
Although a grim picture can be painted of the consequences of
presidential liability for official acts, it is not certain that these dire
predictions would inevitably come to pass. There is no indication that the
Court's decision in Scheuer resulted in a flood of gubernatorial litigation. Therefore it is not reasonable to expect that a similar decision
concerning presidential liability would be abused by a significant number
162. 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).
163. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§
2740-2741 (1973 & Supp. 1977). In Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975), the

civil rights plaintiff was allowed to discover communications between the defendant and
his counsel in order to establish bad faith. Furthermore, a wily plaintiff may be able to

avoid a summary judgment by merely contending that malice can be inferred from all the
surrounding circumstances. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 2730 (1973 & Supp. 1977). See, e.g., Potter v. Baker, 9 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 7802 (D. Conn. May 12, 1975).
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of individuals pressing meritless claims. Since the claim of absolute
immunity is premised upon empirical conjecture, perhaps the courts
should press the civil rights decisions to their logical extreme and deny
absolute immunity to the President. After a period of time, empirical
evidence would be available for a reasoned reassessment of the desirability of an absolute immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since Barr v. Mateo, most of the Supreme Court's decisions
concerning official immunity have been written in the context of civil
rights actions against state officers. In view of the functional equivalence
of state and federal officers, these civil rights decisions should be equally
applicable to federal officials. A review of the Court's various opinions
concerning state and federal officers indicates a limited place for the
Barr decision in the evolving system of federal immunities.
In accordance with longstanding tradition, judges 164 and legislators165 have been cloaked with an absolute immunity, and prosecutors
whose conduct is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process ' 166 have received a similar protection. Finally, certain
congressional assistants have received an absolute immunity in order to
preserve the role of the speech or debate clause. 167 In contrast, the Court
has on three different occasions either held 168 or implied 169 that law
enforcement officers acting within the outer perimeter of their duties are
not entitled to an absolute immunity. Similarly, the Court denied absolute immunity to a very broad range of administrative officials in the
Scheuer decision. In Doe v. McMillan case, the Court expressly refused
to apply Barr in a libel action against the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents. Finally, in Wood and O'Connor v. Donaldson,70
the Court restricted school officials and the superintendent of a public
164. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1872).
165. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
166. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927),
aff'g per curiam, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926).
167. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
168. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
169. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The seeds of Monroe reached fruition in
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Concerning Bivens, see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also HART & WECHSLER 2d, supra note 1, at 1421.
170. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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mental hospital to a qualified immunity. Whether attention is directed at
what the Court is saying or at what it is actually doing, the conclusion is
inescapable that the Barr decision has been relegated to the statue of an
exception to a general rule of qualified immunity for administrative
17
officials. 1
Having concluded that state and federal officials are and should be
accorded coequal protection, the scope of protection available to different officials remains to be considered. Why some officers are blessed
with an absolute immunity, while others must settle for qualified protection, and what the parameters are by which a qualified immunity is to be
measured, are questions left unexplored until future articles.
171. Perhaps the most extreme precedent recognizing this change of attitude is the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Economou v. United
States Dep't. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. grantedsub nom. Butz v.
Economou, 97 S. Ct. 1097 (1977), which involved a suit against various federal officials
"for damages based on their alleged wrongful and malicious enforcement of the Commodity Exchange Act." Id. at 689. Although the defendants were not alleged to have violated
any provisions of the Constitution, the court held that they were, nonetheless, entitled to
only a qualified immunity. The court noted that "the trend as reflected in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, supra, and Wood v. Strickland, supra, has been toward the view that a qualified
rather than an absolute immunity is sufficient to insure the functioning of the executive
branch and at the same time to protect the public against abuse of official power." 535
F.2d at 696.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has followed Barr v. Mateo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959), in an action for defamation. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises,
Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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